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DISCUSSION: THE CLASSICAL
THEORY OF LAW
QUESTIONER 1: I have a question that I will direct to Professor Peller. I think Professor Barry might have been making an empirical argument or he might have been making a phenomenological
argument. I am not sure, but, given that he was talking in terms of
tradition, where is the formalism in his argument, where is the abstract idea, the idea that one would make from some sort of innate
idea or some abstract idea?
PELLER: I may have misinterpreted Professor Barry; if I did I
apologize. As I heard his presentation, he presented an image of
laws prior to legislation, of the common law and private law as the
realm of liberty. And as I understood his presentation, liberty is
threatened through the social welfare intervention of legislation.
What I was suggesting was that the most important teaching of the
realists, what one as a matter of intellectual integrity must confront
if one is to hold on to this particular classical image, is the argument
that the social welfare legislation of the New Deal is not qualitatively
different than the common law because the common law itself is regulatory. And the only way I suggested to avoid that realist point is
the notion that the common law is not regulative because there is an
absolute, determinate way to move from the abstract idea of freedom, equality, contract, and property, to the particular doctrinal
manifestations and concrete cases.
BARRY: I will just make one point for clarification. I was making a kind of epistemological argument about knowledge: it was an
anti-formalist argument to the effect that the human mind is incapable of incapsulating in a formal body of rules this public/private distinction. And the liberal argument also is that individuals are not
ontological entities apart from society who merely contract and set
rules for their ontological separate selves. They do exist as members of units which are more than atomized connections between
themselves. The point is that through their ignorance they will
grope towards a better system of arrangements than if indeed they
could somehow formalize this system. So it is a skeptical argument.
It is saying that if we look around, we find that human needs and
arrangements are better organized through a spontaneous method
by individuals who are already social beings, than if some other person could design a different set of arrangements. So it was indeed,
as the speaker said, a kind of skeptical, epistemological argument.
EPSTEIN: I have a comment upon Professor Peller's presenta310
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tion. I agree with him in part, but I want to set his worst fears aside.
I do not agree with him in respect to everything that he said, particularly about my own position. I think the point that he made is
clearly correct. The failure of natural law theory today is that, to the
extent that one wants to get into a debate about the choice of desirable legal rules and social institutions, he cannot do so on the
grounds that we are blessed with the safety of having necessary
truths that will work on our side. It is a mistake to use the word
"formal" to refer to essentially deductive conclusions which come
from unassailable as self-evident premises. And I think, in effect, a
lot of people thought they could demonstrate that level of certainty
for the rules that they had. The legal scholarship of the realists and
others was fairly powerful in devastating that defense of the old
order.
The question, however, is, is it possible to make reconstruction
of the traditional conceptions by trying to invoke some other more
functional criteria and justifications. It is a subject I did not talk
about today, but which, for example, I do talk about in the Takings'
book. The first thing you have to do is to be aware of the problem of
the straw man. For example, Peller said that people have the idea
that common law rules are not regulatory. I do not think anybody
really believes that, as the paradigmatic common law rule shifts from
contract to torts, we are obviously talking about a whole variety of
restraints, some which operate ex post by way of damages, some
which operate ex ante by way of injunctions. The real question is not
whether we think the common law is or is not regulatory-of course,
it is regulatory. The real question is, does it contemplate a form of
regulation which is superior to some alternative that might be
devised?
The second point goes back to the characterization of what laissez-faire or what the Lochner 2 movement meant. Professor Peller mentioned, for example, that when you were talking about classical
theory, you were talking about "the absence of coercion" that creates liberty in a system with no government intervention. I do not
think any of the classical liberals believed that, and certainly
Peckham did not. To give you but one historical example, Peckham
was a reasonably strong champion of the anti-trust laws, insofar as
they were dealing with horizontal restraints, and he wrote opinions
that supported that particular conclusion. In addition, one of his
great problems in Lochner was that he went a little too far in favor of
state power. The errors in the opinion are contrary to those for
I R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
(1985).
2 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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which he is usually castigated. He thought mistakenly that all matters of health essentially were subjects of such great paramount public importance that state regulation could always displace freedom
of contract. What one has to do, therefore, is to ask how to deal with
the principle of freedom of contract with some sort of functional
justification. Let me give a one minute summary of why I think the
principle had such a great allure, even though from time to time, it
has been misunderstood by those that sought to invoke it.
First, I think it is just wrong to talk about the system and factory
as one of oppression. In fact, in the period he talks about, real economic income in the United States was consistently rising, something by about 30-40% in the period between 1870 and 1914-and
this in the face of enormous immigration of low-priced labor which
could displace higher-priced domestic service. Of course, it was the
unions who wanted to keep my forefathers from coming to these
shores, not the businessmen. One, therefore, must understand that
coercion is not necessarily hierarchical, but often times responds to
the greater weight of the greater number.
Analytically, moreover, wage contracts should not be struck
down whether at common law or by statute because of an alleged
inequality of bargaining power. This concept seems to me to be
incoherent. So why worry as long as somebody can sense, no matter
what his original wealth, that he is going to be better off after the
agreement than he was before? Otherwise if he is going to starve
then he might as well starve in style and go out with a stock equal to
W rather than W-X. So it seems to me that the principle of mutual
benefit within a bargain is something that is perfectly consistent with
a rational social justification of a principle of free contract. It is not
consistent with the welfare state which says that we know better for
what people can do than they can know for themselves.
The second half of the argument is about externalities. The
common lawyers did not talk in these terms but they certainly understood the problem. They were always uneasy about contracts in
restraint of trade, and the reason was that they had some intuition
about the social losses associated with the move from competition to
monopoly. They were also certainly exceedingly hostile to those
contracts which were designed to inflict mayhem, rape, or murder
upon third parties. Those were flatly illegal. There was no principle
of common law which said freedom of contract governed wholly
without regard to the external effects. But what one can say pretty
confidently is that if you are looking at an agreement in which there
is only a transfer of goods and services and money between two parties, both of whom will be left better off than before, then to the
extent to which you increase the wealth of stock of the two parties to
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the transaction, the anticipated external effects are going to be positive when taken in the aggregate. There is now more wealth to go
around, and thus the velocity of voluntary transactions can increase.
Once one understands these points the regime of freedom of contract becomes pretty powerful on a social welfare ground, modernistically understood. We know that there are gains between parties,
and that there are gains with respect to strangers, so it is very hard
to figure out the losers under this general regime.
Even with respect to the feminist jurisprudence, it is striking
when one looks at the particular catalogue of grievances. Virtually
each and every one of them turn out to be legal restrictions against
entry into certain markets. It would be a terrible thing for the law to
say that women must stay at home, but if some women choose to
stay at home when they are free legally to go out somewhere else, it
seems to me that we have learned something about their behavior in
the absence of barriers to entry. What our principle ought to be is
that of the classical liberal idea: keep those barriers down, and the
problem of people sorting themselves into occupations and roles
based upon tastes and upbringing will more or less take care of
itself.
If my analysis of contract is correct, we can make the appropriate reconstruction of private markets and their legal foundations.
Indeed, as a constitutional matter, huge portions of the Constitution
basically have adopted this program, even though I am quite confident that many of the framers only glimpsed at the justification for
their scheme, and could not have given the far more systematic defense of it that I have tried to introduce here. So, I disagree with
Professor Peller very sharply when he says that because the natural
rights theorist fails in proving his beliefs as necessary truths, there
are not sufficient social regularities to justify, empirically, protecting
common law rights at a constitutional level.
BARRY: Just a very important point. Almost all of the classical
liberal legal theorists were anti-natural rights philosophers, partly
because of their skepticism and, I think, partly because they recognized that it is impossible to persuade people of the nature of these
natural rights. But it is possible to persuade people of the advantages that come through mutual exchange and spontaneous order.
Rules emerge as conventions that meet people's needs. They are accepted, on reflection, for this reason, not because they are intrinsically right. So I think I agree entirely with Professor Epstein on that
point.
PELLER: Professor Epstein opposed the argument I
presented, and I think I was not too clear. I was not, of course,
saying that Justice Peckham was an anarchist. I was saying thatJus-
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tice Peckham has a particular view of the relationship between the
private and the public spheres and a particular notion of what the
content of the private and public spheres were. Of course, Justice
Peckham believed in some kind of liberal state which would take
care of the grossest externalities, such as monopoly, and his opinions in monopoly cases confirm that.
The second point that Professor Epstein makes is that there is a
functional as opposed to natural law justification for the laissez-faire
free contract regime. Professor Epstein, again, and I will try to pin
him to this point, simply avoids the issue. Is there a natural way to
distinguish between freedom and coercion, free will and duress,
those concepts as they are actualized in concrete cases, or is there
not? If there is not, then the very distinction between what is called
free will or a free contract and what is called un-free contract, the
distinction between a contract that expresses "preferences" and a
contract that expresses someone else's will, is incoherent, or is itself
a function of social power.
Professor Epstein wants to offer a very thin justification, a utilitarian justification for the free contract regime he envisions by using
the notion that people are moving to preferred positions. The
problem with that notion is that you have to start out with a free
contract concept. Professor Epstein accepts my argument that you
cannot do it through mere formalism, through the notion that the
distinction between free will and coercion is a natural distinction
that we can all simply apply as some kind of vision of natural law. So
he moves to utilitarianism, but utilitarianism, once you open up the
possibility of externalities, gets you nowhere.
If you are going to justify the free contract regime and include
the possibility of externalities, which any utilitarian calculus must,
there is simply no determinate way to account for externalities for
two reasons. The first reason is that any criteria for evaluating two
states of affairs, one in which people have moved to an aggregate
preferred position, and the other where there is a sub-optimal state
of affairs, any compensation criteria is either totally abstract, merely
filled up by the empty concept of "utils," or it is more concrete and
more descriptive, that is, more empirical, and as soon as it gets more
empirical it gets more controversial. Do we include in the notion of
aggregate utils people's preferences as to distributional states? No,
of course, we could not because that would unwind the whole free
contract distribution regime. Do we include, in terms of what
counts as utils to figure in the aggregate social welfare function,
people's aversion to alienation or preferences for social solidarity?
How would we count them? These are not goods that are currently
produced in the current market structure. Is the utilitarian function
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simply a replication of status quo commodities or is it wide enough
to include the possibility of the creation of new commodities that
people might prefer more than the existing market structure. If it
does not include the possibility of new structures, then the claim
cannot be made that the preferences are in any meaningful sense,
exogenous.
The second major problem is the problem of third party preferences. Once we are willing to do an aggregate social welfare function analysis, what about third parties who are really bummed out by
people working in sweatshops for sixteen hours a day. The fact that
we might not grant these parties a legal entitlement to interfere in
the relationship between the employer and employee does not mean
that once we use a utilitarian justification for free contract regime,
there is any basis for ignoring those preferences. They are preferences. To ignore them is a political, controversial, not a simply theoretical, question.
QUESTIONER 2: I was wondering if Professor Peller could
describe a non-utopian situation in which the decision to stay home
with the kids would in fact be a free choice, and if he cannot describe
a choice like that which would be created, what is the point of critiquing the current choice as not being free?
PELLER: I have tried to argue that the notion of individual free
choice as opposed to social coercion, that that way of filtering our
experience of social life, sets up categories that are incoherent. No
decision is totally divorced from social life and social influence. In
that sense if you believe in free choice as this pure kind of individual
preference, I cannot define that kind of utopia. But I can define, I
am suggesting, a kind of quality of life where people are fulfilledwhere people feel that they are able to develop according to their
wishes with due concern for the interest of others. With respect to
the specific gender example, in current social life, the economic
sphere and the public sphere generally are constructed to close-out
women, so that it would be very difficult to say in any instance that a
particular women's decision was "free" since the range of options is
so limited vis-a-vis others-males'-options.
QUESTIONER 3: I get the impression that Professor Epstein
likes the order that is embodied in the American Constitution because it is remarkably close to a sort of Benthamite utilitarian conception of the sort of interactions among individuals that would
produce the best world from the utilitarian point of view. But when
one reads the Constitution, or probably more appropriately looks at
historical documents that describe the sorts of human virtues that
the framers valued, one gets the impression that they, at least, had
all kinds of values that would be rather difficult to capture in the
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utilitarian calculus technique which at its best, I think, suffers from
certain technical defects. Now on the other hand, Barry, who has
given a wonderful summary of Hayek, suggests that the problem
with theoretical rationalistic approaches to politics is that they tend
simply not to capture certain, admittedly sometimes aesthetic,
sometimes spiritual, sometimes hard to categorize goods of human
knowledge about society, and the ways society should be organized
are not easily captured by any particular theory. So I guess my
question is, what is it that is so great about the utilitarian approach,
what is it that is so persuasive about it, that we should only save that
much of the constitutional order that is consistent with it and abandon or leave critiqued, as I take it your approach was to the Roman
law, those portions of it which are not easily justifiable in functional
terms but may embody hard to articulate traditional knowledge,
those forms of Hayekian knowledge which simply cannot be captured in utilitarian terms?
EPSTEIN: I think there is a real difficulty in understanding
what a utilitarian conception of governance entails. On the one
hand, one can endow at the outset legislators and governors with
perfect knowledge of what is going to happen. If people had that
degree of knowledge and we are all well behaved, then in effect we
would want comprehensive social regulations in order to control
and domesticate all those elusive externalities that Professor Peller
talked about. But my sense about utilitarianism is very much
Hayekian. While abstract theorists may identify certain directions,
tendencies, and so forth, there are both imperfections in knowledge
and corruptions in politics with people co-opting, or abusing public
trust for private ends. We should give up on trying to be able to
bring every utilitarian virtue into public life. One of the key utilitarian virtues, oddly enough, is self-destructive. It says, do not adopt
those kinds of rules which in their own form are explicitly utilitarian;
do not count costs and benefits, because once you do that you will
get results that somebody standing back from the fray will see to be
profoundly anti-utilitarian. The balancing tests of an overtly utilitarian nature fuels much of the law of product liability, public liability,
and medical malpractice. So too in constitutional adjudication,
these people were trying to be utilitarians. But the difference between an analyst outside the system and a practitioner within it is
critical. We can know about problems that we cannot solve.
Let me give you one sense of what some of these difficulties are.
Professor Peller noted for example that the utilitarian calculus has
to take into account that there are some people who are "bummed
out" by virtue of the fact that other people are working in sweatshops. But, of course, the bumming out phenomenon runs the
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other way around. There are lots of people, many of whom sit in
this room, who are bummed out if somebody else comes along and
says, "Gee, I know what's best for these fellows. I'm going to keep
them out of the borders so they can starve to death in Mexico." And
he gets bummed-out by a series of restrictive social legislation. To
what extent is any government official going to be able to figure out
which set of bummed-outedness is going to dominate the other?
There is also a moral hazard problem. If you know that freaking out
is the way to get legislation your way, then get yourself some uppers, put the other guy on downers, and do war dances in the street.
So these elusive externalities run in both directions. It is not a
simply a one-directional phenomenon as he implied by that example. They are bi-directional. In the long run you will get a better
assessment of the total utility if you systematically and vigorously
ignore those psychological concerns running in both directions than
if you try to measure them case by case. Take into account the imperfections of measurement, and a lot of the things that a pure
moral utilitarian might regard as relevant should be made essentially irrelevant for the legal order.
Does that mean that people who are bummed out by sweatshops are absolutely helpless in my world? Not if there are all sorts
of voluntary aid societies. Indeed, a classical utilitarian or libertarian like myself accepts the distinction between legal obligations
backed by force, and moral obligations. (Force is "your time or
your life," not a hard bargain of your money for my property.)
There are lots of people who have money, and there is nothing
which says they have to be egoistic in the way they spend it. If they
wish to give it to help people laboring in sweatshops, they can. Is
this a trivial concern? Of course not. There are billions of dollars,
even today, that are spent exactly that way by people with just those
sentiments. People who are upset with the status quo can spend
their money in order to try to bring about a better social order. To
understand the full liberal construct, it is a mistake to concentrate
excessively on the legal side of it. This very powerful set of informal
social and religious obligations is essential to a free society. While
there are some obligations which you cannot define with sufficient
precision and clarity to bring the power of the state to bear, still it
does not mean that social sanctions should be introduced. If you
take the two-tier perspective, it seems to me that both of his points
vanish. We can define a distinction between coercion and non-coercion, because we have a system of property rights which gives us the
legal baseline, while preserving a place for non-unanimous voluntary conduct to alleviate suffering and to bring about perfectly coherent redistributions of wealth from rich to poor.
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QUESTIONER 3: I guess my question is should the Constitution be followed and is the Constitution to be admired only to the
extent that it is justifiable in utilitarian terms? Is there something in
the Constitution that is clearly not utilitarian?
EPSTEIN: The answer to that is sure. I do not admire the provisions which say that slaves count for 3/5 of a person for the purpose of the census, but not at all for vote. It was in the original
Constitution, but I am not going to venerate it. I think the provision
was a mistake. Maybe somebody wants to argue the opposite. I do
not think it will be Professor Peller.
Overall, large parts of the original Constitution are blunders.
There were bad provisions which controlled the election of the President and Vice-President, and these were removed by the twelfth
amendment in 1804. But it is a theory of utilitarianism which says
"Look, for heaven's sakes, do understand the one thing that Hayek
understood so well, that the limits of the public knowledge should
very much influence the way in which we structure our public bodies." There is a critical distinction between public and private bodies. Unfortunately, the state has got the monopoly of force. There
are many employers to whom you can turn, there is only one state
from whom you have to run. That is the difference you worry about.
QUESTIONER 4: As I heard the two sides going here, it
strikes me that you are both really driving at something very similar.
I think that Professor Epstein's position is not that we have this radical bi-polar limited government against the individual, as Professor
Peller in some ways tends to characterize the other side; but then
on the other hand, I also believe that Professor Peller has a point,
that since we do not live in such a neat bi-polar society, that there
are more factors involved than just the freedom of contract between
two individuals. Now at the bottom of all of this, it occurs to me that
maybe the people who were so committed to natural law were not
such dummies. Maybe this was the way they tried to resolve this
thing. My question is, where do we find a principle or a standard of
what is just? If two people making contracts in Professor Peller's
view are not really free, then who is going to help them be free? Is it
going to be the state? If the state makes a decision for them does
that force them to be free? I know that is not what you are saying,
or at least, I hope that is not what you are saying. What you are
crying for is an objective standard of how we can measure justice.
Now how do we go about finding that standard? How do we determine what is just?
EPSTEIN: I think it is a fundamental point to distinguish between scarcity and coercion. If you argue that scarcity of resources
is a form of coercion, there is no such thing as free contract because
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the resources in the world are finite. I think that Professor Peller
gets himself in that position when he finds that he cannot say when
somebody is truly free. The answer is that scarcity coerces. There is
always coercion no matter what the social arrangement, so I think
that one has to go back to the Hobbesian insight as to what coercion
is about. He used to rail against force and fraud. These may be
controlled even if scarcity cannot be.
QUESTIONER 4: But still the question I am placing before
you is, how do we determine a standard of justice?
EPSTEIN: I gave you the theory that I would use which is freedom of contract.
QUESTIONER 4: But you contradicted yourself because in
your main address you sort of kicked out the natural law tradition
altogether.
EPSTEIN: No, I did not. I said that you could not use the natural law tradition to support constitutionalism because the natural
law was always a default rule. What I said was that you could always
reconstruct the justifications and that basically the position would
be, I think one-and here Professor Barry and I are close-that Professor Barry calls indirect utilitarianism, which recognizes that all
the cost-benefit calculations come into the formulation of general
rules, but once the general rules are in place, you avoid the inherent
errors of ad hoc exceptions or ad hoc balancing. I think many of the
early natural law philosophers were indeed indirect utilitarians, but
they just did not use that terminology. You certainly could read
Locke that way when he said that there is a happy coincidence between social welfare and natural right. It is not a very long passage,
but it is suggestive that the distinction between ontological and consequentialist theories of ethics is in fact more modem than classical.
The classical natural law scholars were very smart in certain ways,
but they also made a lot of blunders because they were not systematic. They did not have twentieth century knowledge. We know
more than they did, not because we are smarter, but because we can
build on what they said.
BARRY: I would just like to make one point against Professor
Peller. I found that his argument embodied a certain kind of perfectionism. Look at a market exchange process governed by common
law rules which nobody designed, and you can always find disadvantages enjoyed by some people or endured by some people and advantages enjoyed by others. There always appears to be an element
of private coercion, even in a purely private world. Why does there
appear to be that element of coercion? Well, because you have a
perfectionist vision of a world without coercion, that is, a world in
which all sorts of human things have been eliminated, like self-inter-
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est, greed, scarcity, time preference, and so on. If you look at the
real world with a perfectionistic vision, you will find coercion everywhere. But you only find coercion everywhere because you have got
a kind of vision of a non-coercive world. And I wish that vision were
to be explained more fully for people who take a cautious, skeptical,
or indirect utilitarian view as I do. I mean, it is possible to look at a
market exchange process and see inequality even though the two
parties only act to improve themselves-it is still possible to say,
well, one comes off slightly better than the other; if it is a pareto
criterion, as long as somebody stays where he is and someone gets
slightly better, then we say it is still an improvement. Looks very
tame from a perfectionist standpoint. But what disturbs me is that
we do not have any alternative evaluation which is at all consistent
with what we know about human nature and human experience. So
what is the alternative, coercionless world you propose?
PELLER: I think that you have mischaracterized my argument
if you believe that I was arguing that there is something called coercion that has a natural correlate in the world and I can just go out
and match up the word with the thing coercion. My argument is
that the mode of thought that operates on the distinction between
free will and coercion, and that ends up justifying the gross inequalities of wealth that result from the so-called free market, is itself a
political question unless one is a formalist, or unless one believes in
a natural law of the status quo, as Professor Epstein attempted to
make the distinction between free will and coercion turn on the retention of existing property entitlements. What I am arguing is that
the distinction between free will and coercion is merely a result of
social power. What we call free will is what is not coercion. What is
not coercion is what we call free will. Now unless there is some independent, substantive correlative of these things, I would say that
the notion that coercion in a contract, for example, only exists when
a gun is held to one's head, is about like the notion that rape only
occurs when there is physical force and resistance and the overcoming of resistance. This is the old world. We are in a new world.
EPSTEIN: I hope not on the rape issue, Professor Peller.
QUESTIONER 5: Since the notion of legal coercion does depend, at least to some extent, on the baseline of property rights,
since that is what determines what constitutes force or fraud for purposes of the legal system, assuming that one would want to do so,
how does one avoid interjecting a traditional natural law justificatory element at the level of a developing theory of initial acquisition
of property, as opposed to exchange, which can be handled by reference to subsequently developed contract law?
EPSTEIN: I think that you asked the right question. I think it
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can be done, and I think what you have to do is to go back to the
theory of transaction of cost economics, which is not where I would
have started this life twenty years ago.
QUESTIONER 5: Let me interrupt. There are two parts to the
question, one is why would one want to avoid a natural rights justification, and the second one is, assuming that one would want to do
so, how.
EPSTEIN: I do not want to avoid it if you can make it go. The
problem is that I do not think that you can make it go simply by an
assertion. What one tries to do is to figure out how those natural
rights serve some social ends. If we had a system of natural rights of
the sort that the Lockeans or the common lawyers envisioned, but it
turned out that we could figure out that everybody was worse off
under that regime than under some alternative arrangements, presumably, we would want to move from the natural rights arrangement to the other. If the various tests of pareto-dominance make
sense, then you cannot ignore them when it comes to the formulation of natural rights.
Now, it is quite clear that there is an ambiguity in talking about
existing rights structures. There is nobody here in the natural law,
the utilitarian tradition, I take it, who would want to say that if somebody happened to steal something without being caught, that has
created an appropriate natural distribution of rights which serves as
the baseline for all subsequent transactions. There is a very radical
streak to natural rights and utilitarian theories which says that huge
transfers, like for example, those from the Indians and those acquired by force and fraud from others, are not to be protected. The
great difficulty is to figure out some way to undo these improper
moves without completely undoing the society. A system of wealth
which comes out of apartheid or segregation is not the kind of natural distribution that I would want to defend, even though it is the
status quo.
The second point is the empirical point. I think Professor
Peller is just wrong when he says that when you look at the distribution of wealth, the vast inequalities of wealth are attributable to market institutions. The empirical argument is that disproportionate
wealth arises from entrenched monopolies protected through legislation that exclude rivals. If you were to use any measure of income
dispersion for market economics against totalitarian societies, or socialist countries, you will find far greater skews where people can
keep out rivals. What competition does, not perfectly, but inexorably and inevitably, is to reduce certain super-normal profits to normal returns.
Now, the analytical question, how do you get a system of natu-

322

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 73:3 10

ral rights based on first possession, how do you decide what things
are both public and private, I think the answer to use if starting from
a blank slate is to try to figure out which distribution of original
property rights will minimize the number of transactions necessary
to reach the optimal social state. That would be the formula. Selfownership, for example, fits that very well because it now means that
everybody has a capacity to deal on his own account; no one has to
engage in all sorts of preliminary transactions to decide who is entitled to deal for whom. With respect to the external world, the "noownership" position, standard common law probably does better
than anything else because first possession is a cheap and easy way
to get property rights established. Thereafter the eminent domain
calculus says that, where the markets break down because transaction costs are too high, we could overcome it by force. So I think
that basically that single regimen, the insight that Ronald Coase
started with in a completely different context, if pushed far enough,
explains huge portions of traditional natural law theory and essentially makes it much more respectable than the intuitive explanations offered by natural rights theorists.
QUESTIONER 5: The notion of an optimal social state as part
of the justification for the initial property rights scheme involves laying claim to a kind of knowledge that the Hayekian analysis would
suggest we cannot have.
EPSTEIN: The problem arises only if the argument is used to
mandate a set of individual outcomes, but it has less force when figuring out some simple rule that works as a default provision. And
that is what the common law rules did. They were extraordinarily
simple; they were extraordinarily de-centralized; the cost of implementation of getting everybody into self-ownership was lower, I
think, on a first cut than on anything else. The Hayekian impulse is
do not try and be fancy and overdo that with something more convoluted and complex just because you want to correct every last error. Simple rules have major practical advantages. Beware of
Peller's skepticism that everything is coercion and nothing makes
any sense. Remember, he cannot be a member of the left; he has to
drop off the political spectrum given his own views about knowledge
and coercion. I think we can make empirical judgments about property. I think the uniform historical sentiment on first possession is
pretty good evidence as to its soundness.
QUESTIONER 6: I want to ask Professor Peller about his utopia, to take a step back. He criticized, from my understanding, several social relations, which are the basis of our society, and he said
that maybe some of it is based on arrangements which provide new
commodities that might be more important to the human soul than
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perhaps material gains. As I look around here, I see that people
always look at each other in order to get an idea of what they want to
be. And so this freedom, this utopia, this new system you propose
would ask us all to be saints, which is in some sense a little difficult
perhaps. But even that would probably be easier than a utopia
which asks us all to be very individualistic, to be very different from
each other, to be original. And I want to suggest that this is also
something very painful for the human spirit, that it is very hard to be
original, and so this particular utopia seems very coercive, and perhaps some of the sorts of social relationships in society that define,
in very clear terms, the ways people interact with each other, are
perhaps milder and perhaps moderate the coercion that comes from
social pressure.
PELLER: I really was not trying to offer a big blueprint for
what is or is not coercion. And to respond to Professor Epstein's
point that I am off the political map because I believe that everything is coercion, once again, -I do not know why this point is so
difficult to understand. The point is that coercion is a social construct, and that what gets called coercion is a political choice. And
the point is, I think, fairly simple.
Now with respect to the various hierarchies between teacher
and student, worker and manager, man and woman, and the like
that I have mentioned, that I believe inhibit the possibilities for social interaction, I was offering as an utopian vision the notion that
we do not need to accept these as simply givens of life, that they
have a social subjectivity to them and, therefore, a contingency. My
vision is that we could recover the possibilities for acting out social
roles with some conviction and engagement while we are in them.
Instead, we find ourselves playing out a part someone else wrote, we
know not whom. And towards that I simply will assert from my experience that, for example, even if there is some functional justification for the distinction between teachers and students, or workers
and managers, at some point that has nothing to do with the particular concrete embodiment in which they are played out today.
I think that the relationship, for example, in an educational institution, in a law school, between teachers and students ought to be
far more democratic, and there is simply no functional basis to the
kinds of fears that you are expressing, that there will through democracy and the collective engagement of the terms of social life be
some coercion or pressure. I think that the risks of that are far less
than the coercion and pressure that exist as we all kind of act out
these roles. I think that law schools ought to be run popularly and
democratically. I do not think that is such a bizarre concept.
EPSTEIN: But the genius is, heaven forbid, that all law schools
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should have to run that way. Let him run his that way, let us run
ours our way, and then let us see which way the students come.
Then we will get information as to their relative desirability, which
we could not acquire if we could made an all-for-one centralized
choice. That turns out to be the key element. You may have a vision of what you want to do. But I think one has to recognize, and
this, I think, is core to liberal theory, that the standards to apply in
deciding what to do with yourself and with others who agree with
you are different than the standards to apply in imposing by threat
of arms and force your views on your rivals or upon your neighbors.
It may well be that there is a best way to organize a law school. If so,
one could see all evolution in that direction without any change in
the legal norms that govern contracts. There is nothing about the
liberal order, or the principle of freedom of contracts, that dictates
how law schools deal with students. If schools want to change, there
is no law that has to be repealed first. Nobody wants to say that
people are "autonomous" in some cultural sense that nobody believes. We all know that acculturation is essential. Anybody who
has children knows that they do not just grow up like topsy. The
real issue is who is going to fit standards? One at the center, or
many at the periphery? It seems to me it is that choice which should
make us aware of the dangers of monopoly for social experiences as
it leads us to recognize the dangers of monopoly for ordinary economic affairs.
PELLER: The law school example is a particularly good example. As Professor Epstein well knows I do not believe in centralized
social power as a political theory. The distinction, though, is in the
terms of this asserted natural evolution of institutional forms. And
this now matches up with the argument about externalities. I think
there are a lot of people who have preferences that their work life,
that their educational life, and that their family lives be different, be
freer, be more engaged, be more emotionally committed, be more
fulfilling, be more reflective of the self and subjectivity. The fact
that the current structure does not produce those kinds of institutions suggests not that a slow natural evolution will produce them; it
suggests precisely the opposite. Professor Epstein's point that the
market will satisfy everything is contradicted by the failure of the
"free market" of education to produce democratically run law
schools. In addition, Professor Epstein's comment again misses the
central point that I thought I was fairly clear with, with respect to
the legal realists. The point is not centralized social power versus
decentralized individual choice. The point is that both those concepts are incoherent. There is no such thing as the free market not
regulated by social power.
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EPSTEIN: I think we have said all we have to say. I think in the
end, it is an invitation to totalitarianism if you cannot distinguish
between markets and coercion. The willingness to use coercion will
be the death of the market and of personal liberty.

